IIM Feeds for adversary infrastructure chains.

IIM chain for the ClearFake activity cluster, ranked the most prevalent threat in Red Canary's May 2026 intelligence insights. ClearFake injects JavaScript into compromised websites to deliver malware via drive-by techniques, frequently using fake CAPTCHA lures that trick users into executing code via malicious copy-and-paste (paste-and-run / ClickFix / fakeCAPTCHA). Red Canary reports ClearFake has delivered multiple payloads over time including ArechClient2 and LummaC2, and most recently ACR Stealer, a malware-as-a-service infostealer. The paste-and-run user-execution step is endpoint behaviour and is recorded only under attack_annotations.

IIM chain for the VENOMOUS#HELPER campaign reported by Securonix (covered 2026-05-04). A U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) impersonation email instructs the recipient to verify their address and download a purported SSA statement. The embedded link points to a compromised legitimate Mexican business website used to evade email filters; the executable is then pulled from a second attacker-controlled domain staged through a single compromised cPanel account on a legitimate hosting server. The JWrapper-packaged Windows executable installs the SimpleHelp RMM tool, registers as a Windows service with Safe Mode persistence, and uses a self-healing watchdog. The chain models only the infrastructure layer; the watchdog, service install, and Safe Mode persistence are endpoint behaviour recorded under attack_annotations.

IIM chain for GoDaddy Security research published on 2026-05-28. The report describes WordPress malware found across roughly 1,980 infected sites since July 2025. The malware uses compromised WordPress plugin/theme PHP files to fetch Steam Community profile comments, extract the commentthread_comment_text content, decode an invisible-Unicode payload with optional AES-256-CTR/PBKDF2/HMAC protection, and inject the decoded URL as frontend JavaScript through wp_enqueue_script using the handle asahi-jquery-min-bundle. The observed decoded payload URL is hxxps://hello-mywordl[.]info/js/lodash[.]core[.]min[.]js. In parallel, the same PHP malware exposes a cookie-authenticated server-side backdoor that responds to DEpjndDbNc ping cookies and accepts base64-encoded PHP replacement code through tEcaKKXEsb plus POST parameter new_code, allowing remote modification of plugin and theme files. The initial WordPress compromise vector is not confirmed by GoDaddy, so this chain starts at the confirmed infected PHP/plugin/theme layer and records initial access as a limitation rather than inventing a vulnerable plugin, stolen credential, or supply-chain path.

IIM chain for Seqrite Operation XENOFISCAL, published 2026-05-29. The campaign targets Afghanistan Ministry of Finance provincial officials with a spearphishing ZIP containing a Pashto malicious LNK. The LNK launches mshta.exe and retrieves obfuscated HTA/JavaScript from compromised Afghan education domain abimj.edu.af/index.php. The script reconstructs an in-memory .NET loader, downloads an Afghan Ministry of Finance decoy PDF, persists zuidrt.hta, retrieves additional payload blobs from /institute/10/ or /institute/7/, reconstructs shellcode, loads XenoRAT, and connects to hardcoded C2 IP 185.235.137.106 hosted on AS59711/HZ Hosting infrastructure.

Cisco Talos reported UAT-10362 spear-phishing Taiwanese NGOs and suspected universities with shortened URLs leading to password-protected archives. The modeled chain follows the LNK-based path: archive delivery, hidden nested folder staging, LucidPawn dropper, LucidRook stager, compromised FTP infrastructure used for payload retrieval and exfiltration, and a DNS beaconing domain observed in the IOC set