IIM Feeds for adversary infrastructure chains.

IIM chain for GoDaddy Security research published on 2026-05-28. The report describes WordPress malware found across roughly 1,980 infected sites since July 2025. The malware uses compromised WordPress plugin/theme PHP files to fetch Steam Community profile comments, extract the commentthread_comment_text content, decode an invisible-Unicode payload with optional AES-256-CTR/PBKDF2/HMAC protection, and inject the decoded URL as frontend JavaScript through wp_enqueue_script using the handle asahi-jquery-min-bundle. The observed decoded payload URL is hxxps://hello-mywordl[.]info/js/lodash[.]core[.]min[.]js. In parallel, the same PHP malware exposes a cookie-authenticated server-side backdoor that responds to DEpjndDbNc ping cookies and accepts base64-encoded PHP replacement code through tEcaKKXEsb plus POST parameter new_code, allowing remote modification of plugin and theme files. The initial WordPress compromise vector is not confirmed by GoDaddy, so this chain starts at the confirmed infected PHP/plugin/theme layer and records initial access as a limitation rather than inventing a vulnerable plugin, stolen credential, or supply-chain path.

IIM chain for Seqrite Operation Dragon Weave, published 2026-05-29. The campaign targets Czech Republic and Taiwan using a spearphishing ZIP with two delivery paths. Path A uses a PDF-masquerading LNK to launch empty.vbs and Profile.ps1, which decrypts 1.dat into RuntimeBroker_update.exe and prepares UnityPlayer.dll plus Com.dat. Path B uses a Rust executable dropper to extract the same sideloading components. Both paths converge on RuntimeBroker_update.exe loading malicious UnityPlayer.dll (RUSTCLOAK), which decrypts Com.dat and executes AZUREVEIL, an Adaptix C2 agent. AZUREVEIL uses Microsoft Azure Blob Storage as dead-drop style C2 through note1ggbbhggdwa1.blob.core.windows.net and the /note/ats/ blob path pattern.

IIM chain for Glassworm as documented by CrowdStrike on 2026-05-26: the operators targeted developers through OpenVSX/VS Code-style extensions, npm and Python packages, and poisoned GitHub repositories. The installed malware delivered Glassworm downloader/RAT capability and resolved operational endpoints through four resilient C2 channels: Solana transaction memo dead-drops, BitTorrent DHT configuration lookup, Google Calendar event-title dead-drops, and direct commercial VPS C2 servers. CrowdStrike, Google and Shadowserver disrupted the channels simultaneously. Exact malicious package names and original VPS C2 addresses were not published in the source article; this chain models the confirmed infrastructure architecture without inventing unpublished IoCs.

IIM chain for the November 2025 Gamaredon zero-click delivery path: a Ukraine-themed RAR archive abuses CVE-2025-6218/CVE-2025-8088 style archive delivery to place an HTA in the Windows Startup folder. The HTA/loader reaches DynDNS-backed delivery infrastructure, retrieves/launches Pteranodon, and then uses Telegram/graph.org dead-drop resolver infrastructure plus DynDNS/Fast-Flux C2 nodes for tasking and payload rotation.

CloudSorcerer v3 lane where malware retrieves C2 information from public web services and then connects to decoded UAT-8302 C2 domains published by Talos.