IIM Feeds for adversary infrastructure chains.

IIM chain for the Wiz Research report published on 2026-05-27 describing JINX-0164 supply-chain activity. The chain models trojanized npm package @velora-dex/sdk version 4.9.1, a malicious dist/index.js addition that decodes and runs a curl command to 89.36.224.5/troubleshoot/mac/install.sh, dropper delivery, MINIRAT macOS payload execution, and the shared datahub.ink / cloud-sync.online / byte-io.us C2 domain set. It intentionally does not invent npm account credentials, unpublished package download telemetry beyond Wiz/StepSecurity references, or a source-repository compromise because Wiz explicitly says the GitHub source code was not modified.

IIM chain for the OX Security report published on 2026-05-27 about the malicious npm package mouse5212-super-formatter. The package presents itself as an internal archive deployment sync utility, but during post-installation it authenticates to GitHub using either a victim environment token or a hardcoded fallback token, checks or creates an actor-controlled repository, recursively walks the local /mnt/user-data directory, and uploads collected files through the GitHub Contents API. OX observed around seven active exfiltration sessions in the actor repository before takedown and reported 676 downloads at time of publication. The exact actor account, repository name, hardcoded token value, and package tarball hashes were not published in the text; those are intentionally not invented here.

IIM chain for the Microsoft-described cryptojacking campaign published on 2026-05-26. The operation uses search-engine poisoning and observed AI-chatbot referral contexts to send users looking for trusted GPU/system utilities to attacker-controlled lookalike download sites. Those sites deliver ZIP archives from Dynu-backed gleeze/giize Dynamic DNS subdomains. The archive contains a legitimate utility executable and malicious autorun.dll variants. The DLL silently installs a ScreenConnect payload masquerading as vcredist_x64.dll, establishing persistent RMM access to directdownload.icu / 193.42.11.108. After the ScreenConnect session is established, the operator transfers SimpleRunPE.exe, which installs RuntimeHost.exe, hollows Microsoft-signed .NET utilities, and connects to the encrypted WebSocket C2 wss://minemine.gleeze.com:8443/ws with hardcoded TLS certificate pinning. The same certificate was observed on three additional IPs Microsoft assesses as part of the C2 infrastructure. The hollowed loader later downloads GPU-focused mining tools at runtime

IIM chain for Glassworm as documented by CrowdStrike on 2026-05-26: the operators targeted developers through OpenVSX/VS Code-style extensions, npm and Python packages, and poisoned GitHub repositories. The installed malware delivered Glassworm downloader/RAT capability and resolved operational endpoints through four resilient C2 channels: Solana transaction memo dead-drops, BitTorrent DHT configuration lookup, Google Calendar event-title dead-drops, and direct commercial VPS C2 servers. CrowdStrike, Google and Shadowserver disrupted the channels simultaneously. Exact malicious package names and original VPS C2 addresses were not published in the source article; this chain models the confirmed infrastructure architecture without inventing unpublished IoCs.

IIM chain for the November 2025 Gamaredon zero-click delivery path: a Ukraine-themed RAR archive abuses CVE-2025-6218/CVE-2025-8088 style archive delivery to place an HTA in the Windows Startup folder. The HTA/loader reaches DynDNS-backed delivery infrastructure, retrieves/launches Pteranodon, and then uses Telegram/graph.org dead-drop resolver infrastructure plus DynDNS/Fast-Flux C2 nodes for tasking and payload rotation.

Cisco Talos reported an ongoing campaign active since at least December 2025 against U.S. education and health care victims. The modeled chain follows the PowerShell downloader, remote batch script, C2-hosted malicious DLL retrieval, Dohdoor loader execution, DNS-over-HTTPS resolution through Cloudflare, Cloudflare-fronted C2 communication, and reflective next-stage payload retrieval

Cisco Talos reported UAT-10362 spear-phishing Taiwanese NGOs and suspected universities with shortened URLs leading to password-protected archives. The modeled chain follows the LNK-based path: archive delivery, hidden nested folder staging, LucidPawn dropper, LucidRook stager, compromised FTP infrastructure used for payload retrieval and exfiltration, and a DNS beaconing domain observed in the IOC set

Cisco Talos observed a campaign targeting Czech organizations and workforce-related victims. The chain uses a malicious ZIP, LNK-triggered PowerShell loader, an embedded PowMix payload hidden in the ZIP data blob, and C2 communication via Heroku-hosted infrastructure using REST-like URL paths.

Observed Silver Fox campaign using tax-themed delivery to distribute a customized RustSL loader, ValleyRAT, custom ValleyRAT modules and the ABCDoor Python backdoor. The chain models only infrastructure and delivery composition aspects; endpoint persistence and execution details are kept in ATT&CK annotations or notes.

ESET-documented Webworm infrastructure lane using Microsoft Graph / OneDrive for GraphWorm command traffic and Amazon S3 infrastructure for WormFrp-related reconnaissance/exfiltration.